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Abstract 
 
This article examines the impact of the economic crisis and its aftermath on collective 
bargaining by comparing reactions to austerity policies of trade unions in healthcare and 
education sectors in Romania. It develops an encompassing theoretical framework that links 
strategies used by trade unions with power resources, costs, and union democracy. We argue 
that trade unions in the healthcare sector have successfully deployed their resources to 
advance their interests and obtain significant wage increases and better working conditions. 
We show that in a context of a tight labour market, generated by the massive emigration of 
doctors, trade union confederations in the healthcare sector have been increasingly successful 
in negotiating better pay. We also show that in the aftermath of the crisis healthcare trade 
unions have redefined their strategies and adopted a more militant stance based on a 
combination of local strikes, strike threats, and forging temporary alliances with various 
stakeholders. By comparison, we find that trade unions in the education sector have adopted 
less effective strategies built around negotiations with governments combined with national 
level militancy. 
 
Introduction 
 
East European (EE) systems of industrial relations have undergone numerous structural 
changes both before and after accession to the European Union (EU). These changes 
contributed to the weakening of the relative position of organised labour, and as some of the 
  2 
OLWHUDWXUH VXJJHVWV WUDQVIRUPHG LW LQWR D µVWUDQJHFDVHRIQRQ-GHDWK¶RI D VWLOO H[LVWHQWEXW
largely irrelevant collective actor (Crowley 2004; Ost 2000; Meardi 2011). Still, mounting 
empirical evidence on trade union revitalisation strategies shows that labour organisations in 
the region are not uniformly weak. Rather, EE trade unions have used the opportunities 
provided by institutional and economic changes to regroup and rebuild organisational 
resources, devise new strategies, develop their power resources, and defend the interests of 
their constituents (Kaminska and Kahancová 2011; Bernaciak and Kahancová 2017). 
This paper seeks to contribute to the developing literature on trade union strategies by 
exploring the factors that have contributed to the strategic successes and failures of the trade 
unions in the Romanian public sectors. Using a power resource theoretical framework, we 
analyse the repertoire of strategies employed by trade union federations in two sectors, 
healthcare and education, between 2008 and 2018. We show that although structurally trade 
union federations in both sectors have faced similar pressures, healthcare trade unions such 
as Sanitas have been more successful in delivering benefits to their members. We argue that 
the success of Sanitas can be explained both by its diversified strategy that makes use of 
targeted strikes and protests creating a sense of constant militancy, and by its use of emigration 
and labour shortages in the healthcare sector as an additional source of pressure for pushing 
for pay increases. 
In comparison, we show that union federations in the education sector such as the Federation 
of Free Trade Unions in the Education (FSLI) have relied primarily on direct negotiations 
with government representatives as their main strategy. In the context of an increasingly 
volatile political competition that generated numerous changes in government1, this strategy 
has been less effective in promoting better wages and working conditions. Furthermore, the 
strategy has failed to frame the interests of workers in the education sector as a broader 
societal issue and contributed their side-lining in. To support our argument, we collected 
original empirical data from ten in-depth interviews with trade unionists. In addition, we use 
secondary data such as collective bargaining agreements, official statistical data, newspaper 
articles, and legal texts. 
In broader terms, the paper shows that trade unions can be successful even in contexts in 
which governments openly promote anti-union legislation. However, success remains 
                                                          
1
 Sixteen cabinets have been in place between January 2007 and April 2018, sometimes reaching four cabinet reshuffles 
under the same prime minister. 
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localised and the building of cross-sectoral coalitions is hampered by the framing of public 
sector reforms in terms of a zero-sum game. Even more, as the empirical section of the article 
will show, a key problem for public sector trade unions remains the articulation of common 
interests and the building of within-sector solidarities in the context of increasing pay 
inequalities. 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section will make a case for taking into account 
union agency in order to explain variation in collective bargaining outcomes. It will argue that 
the analysis of trade union power should be contextualised by paying attention to how unions 
use resources, devise strategies and how these are impacted by economic, institutional, and 
ideological factors. A close scrutiny of the relative position of the unions within the public 
sector reveals a heterogeneous picture both in terms of what unions do and in what they 
succeed to achieve. The following section will describe the situation in healthcare and 
education sectors in Romania and the reforms that have been passed in the two sectors since 
the onset of the economic crisis. The next two sections will discuss the strategies adopted by 
healthcare and education unions during the economic crisis and in its aftermath. We will put 
particular emphasis on the gains in terms of pay and working conditions that trade unions in 
each of the sectors obtained. The last section concludes with a summary of our argument. 
 
Power Resources and Trade Union Strategies 
 
The power of trade unions is mediated by institutional and economic contexts and is derived 
from various resources that unions can deploy to advance their interests (Gumbrell-
McCormick and Hyman 2013). The literature distinguishes between several broad sources of 
trade union power: associational, organisational, collaborative, structural, discursive and 
logistical (Offe and Wiesenthal 1980; Heller 1999; Ganz 2000; Levesque and Murray 2003; 
Silver 2003; Frege and Kelly 2004; Jarley 2005; Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2013). 
Associational power stems from the organisation of workers as a collective. It refers to the 
resources and capabilities developed by trade unions in order to recruit and represent workers 
and serves as a signalling mechanism that can increase the credibility of strike threats (see 
Table 1 below). Since membership alone does not necessarily mean active engagement by 
union members, associational power can be low even when trade unions boost large 
membership bases. On the other hand, in the case of union federations, associational power is 
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linked with the level engagement that local unions have, and is low when local unions feel 
that the national leadership does not defend their interests. The use of associational power 
resources has low costs for trade unions since it is usually mobilised in order to indicate the 
existence of a conflict through strike threats. 
6WUXFWXUDOSRZHUUHIHUVWRWKHSRZHUZKLFKUHVXOWVIURPZRUNHUV¶SRVLWLRQLQWKHHFRQRPLF
system. Silver (2003) further distinguishes two subtypes of structural power that are 
marketplace bargaining power and workplace bargaining power. The first refers to the power 
WKDWUHVXOWVµGLUHFWO\IURPWLJKWODERXUPDUNHWV¶6LOYHU7KHVHFRQGUHfers to how 
workers are integrated into the production process. Workers whose location is vital for 
production will be more likely to obtain concessions from employers because disruptions such 
as protests or work stoppages will negatively impact large segments of the economy. High 
levels of structural power can be used to extract rapid concessions from employers and 
therefore involve average costs for trade unions. 
In contrast, organisational power refers to the capacity of trade unions to cultivate their social 
capital and create a sense of unity among the rank and file (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 
2013). The use of organisational power involves high costs for trade unions both because it 
requires the coordination and mobilisation of membership as well as because it can backfire 
in cases when mobilisation fails to bring the desired outcome. However, it can also enhance 
union solidarity while also possibly generating confrontational behaviours from other actors 
or interest groups. This power resource is fundamental for union deployment of adversarial 
strategies such as strikes and ultimately for the success of strike actions. 
Union power can also be augmented by cultivating relationships with other actors through 
formal coalitions or through creating similar agendas. This type of power relies extensively 
RQ WKHXQLRQ OHDGHUVKLS¶VFDSDFLW\ WR LGHQWLI\ WUXVWZRUWK\SDUWQHUVDQGPDLQWDLQFRDOLWLRQV
once these are established. Collaborative power is also costly for the trade unions because it 
involves investment of time, resources and social capital in building coalitions. It also usually 
requires trade unions to moderate their policy position, a strategy that can be costly in the long 
run by decreasing the internal legitimacy of the leadership. Looking at the intra-sectoral 
capacity of unions to create coalitions, Table 2 shows that healthcare trade unions are more 
likely to generate coalitions because fragmentation levels in the sector are lower. 
Relative to these dimensions, trade unions in the Romanian educational and healthcare sectors 
possess different levels of associational and structural power. As Table 2 shows, in both 
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sectors, the largest union confederations organise around 40 percent of the labour force, with 
the unions in education claiming a density rate of 74 percent. Structural power also varies 
between the two sectors. As Silver (2003, 114±18) notes, teachers have low levels of 
workplace bargaining power mainly due to their spatial distribution which makes striking 
difficult. However, teachers usually have high levels of marketplace bargaining power due to 
their location in the social division of labour. 
 
 Cost for trade unions  
Low Average High 
Strategy 
Cooperative 
Media 
campaign, 
Communicating  
with the rank 
and file and a 
wider audience 
Direct 
negotiations 
Collective 
bargaining 
Alliance with 
other interest 
groups Union 
leaders 
Key 
agent 
 Logistical 
Discursive 
Institutional Collaborative 
 
Power type 
Associational Structural Organisational 
Adversarial 
Strike threats Pickets, 
Warning 
strikes, Work 
to rule, Go-
slow, 
Overtime 
bans 
General strike, 
Warning strike, 
Political 
strikes, 
Workshop 
strike, Wildcat 
strike  
Union 
Members 
 Low Average High  
Cost for trade unions 
Table 1. The relationship between power resources and bargaining strategies of trade 
unions. 
By comparison, healthcare workers have high levels of workplace bargaining power. 
Disruption in the operations of a single hospital has immediate effects on patient care. 
'RFWRUV¶SURWHVWVDUHYLVLEOHHYHQWVWKDWSXWXQGHUDEDGOLJKWWKHJRYHUQPHQW&RQVHquently, 
in EE doctors have high levels of marketplace bargaining power because of mass emigration 
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(Szabo 2013). Emigration can impact union power directly by impacting membership and 
density rates or indirectly by reducing unemployment and generating labour shortages. This 
enhances the position of unions in collective bargaining (Kaminska and Kahancová 2011). 
Furthermore, healthcare workers have a high level of marketplace bargaining power due to 
the availability of jobs in the private sector. As the next section will show, the country has 
witnessed a growing internal migration from the public to the private healthcare sector which 
has impacted heavily on the quality of care that the Romanian public hospitals currently 
provide.
  7 
Sector Trade 
Union 
Year 
established 
Membership 
 
Collective 
bargaining 
level/ last year 
of 
certification 
in court 
National 
Confederatio
n 
Ideology Fragmen
tation 
index* 
Fragmentatio
n index** 
Sectoral 
union 
concentration 
index*** Total From 
sector 
Healthcare Sanitas 1994 91766 40% Sectoral level 
(2016) 
CNSLR-)Uă܊LD Social-
democratic 
1.5 Medium (0.3) Extreme (0.66) 
Healthcare Solidaritate
D6DQLWDUă 
2002 16791 7% Sectoral level 
(2016) 
Cartel Alfa Christian-
democratic 
Healthcare Hipocrat 1990 3835 2% Group of units 
(2013) 
Cartel Alfa Christian-
democratic 
Healthcare CFSMR 
(Confederat
ion of 
'RFWRUV¶
Trade 
Unions 
1990 2200 1% NO 
representativen
ess 
Cartel Alfa Christian-
democratic 
Education FSLI 1990 16269
7 
56% Sectoral level 
(2017) 
CSDR Christian-
democratic 
2.1 High (0.5) High (0.48) Education FSE-Spiru Haret 
1995 75683 22% Sectoral level 
(2018) 
CNSLR-)Uă܊LD Social-
democratic 
Education Alma Mater 1990 20632 6% Group of units 
(2017) 
Cartel Alfa Christian-
democratic 
Table 2. Trade union fragmentation / concentration in the healthcare and education sectors. 
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Notes: Collective bargaining in groups of units allows for the signing of collective bargaining 
agreements in various units within the same sector. The legal representativeness certified by court is 
valid for a four-year period. 
* Based on Laakso-Taagepera(1979) index of effective number of parties. 
** Based on Rae-Taylor (1971, 55±56) index of effective number of parties. 
*** Based on Herfindahl-Hirschman index of concentration (Hirschman 1945, 160±62) computed on 
the total number of union members. 
Source of data0LQLVWU\RI:RUNFRXUWGHFLVLRQVDXWKRUV¶FRPSLODWLRQ 
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Logistical and discursive power describe the capacity of unions to make use of their resources 
efficiently and the ability to voice their positions in a convincing manner by articulating a 
coherent vision of societal change. The use of these resources involves low costs for the 
unions but can have important consequences for the success of union actions.  
Institutional power captures the capacity of trade unions to use statutory rights, legislative 
supports or membership in public bodies to advance their interests. It is path-dependent in 
WKDWLVµGHULYHGIURPIRUPHUVWUXJJOHVRUFRQFHGHGE\WKHVWDWH¶ (Schmidt et al. 2018). In the 
aftermath of the crisis the institutional power of Romanian trade unions has been practically 
eliminated through the passing of a new social dialogue law which removed the possibility of 
signing a national level collective bargaining agreement which was a crucial mechanism for 
setting minimum wages (Muntean 2011, 36± $GăVFăOL܊HL DQG *XJD  7R EH
recognised as legitimate partners in social dialogue, trade unions had to re-apply for gaining 
representativeness - a requirement that has increased the costs of using institutional power 
resources. At the same time, the costs associated with using institutional channels are 
relatively large because they require a good knowledge of the rules of the game. 
To summarise, given the similar institutional and logistic power resources but different levels 
of associational, structural, discursive and logistic power, we expect unions in the healthcare 
sector to fare better in defending the rights of the workers they represent. We argue that the 
structural power advantages that the national union confederations in the healthcare sector 
poses were used in order to devise strategies of disruption that minimised costs for the trade 
unions while maximising the political consequences for the government. This optimization 
strategy was especially visible in the aftermath of the crisis when healthcare professionals 
shifted their protest behaviour from nation-wide calls for general strikes to maintaining strikes 
in key hospitals around the country for longer periods. Ironically, while in the short term the 
pay cuts passed in response to the crisis did hurt healthcare workers, in the medium term they 
provided the basis for increased mobilisation. 
 
Public Sector in the Aftermath of the Crisis 
 
In Romania, public sector reform has been a constant on the agenda of successive 
governments (Vasile 2013). Both healthcare and education sectors have undergone numerous 
and often contradictory reforms that ultimately led to frustration amongst workers in the two 
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sectors and created an unpredictable institutional environment. However, one constant 
remained: both systems continued to be heavily underfunded with the healthcare sector being 
somehow better-off in terms of budgetary allocations. As Figure 1 shows, on average, 
between 2009 and 2017 healthcare spending has been around 4.1 percent of GDP while 
education spending amounted to around 3.3 percent. These levels situate Romania amongst 
the lowest welfare spenders within the EU, together with Bulgaria and the Baltic States. More 
so, the Figure suggests that the crisis has been a turning point for the budgets allocated to the 
two sectors. Whereas before the crisis the budgetary allocations to education clearly surpassed 
those for healthcare, after 2008, the trend was reversed, with the gap between healthcare and 
education expenditures widening after especially after 2013. 
 
Figure 1. Healthcare and Education Expenditure as a share 
of GDP in Romania: 2000 - 2017. 
Source: World Bank, Eurostat, Romanian Ministry of 
Finance. 
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The underfunding of the two sectors has translated into low average wages especially before 
the onset of the economic crisis. Although before the crisis both sectors have secured annual 
wage increases (see Figure 2) these did not fully compensate for the growing living costs 
(Stan 2012, 68). Furthermore, the problem of low wages has been compounded by large 
inequalities in pay levels between various groups of workers leading to the puzzling situation 
in which wage inequality in Romania is larger in the public sector than in the private sector 
(Vasile 2013). The most recent available data, show that the earnings of majority of workers 
in both sectors are above the minimum wage but below the average wage (see Figure 5 and 
Figure 6 in the Appendix).2  
 
 
Figure 2. Year on year increases in net real wages (adjusted for CPI) in education 
and healthcare sectors compared with minimum wages for the entire economy: 
2000 -2017.  
Source: Own calculations based on data from the National Institute of Statistics. 
                                                          
2
  In December 2015, the average gross wage in Romania was 2930 RON (Romanian Lei) or 653 EUR. 
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However, for many workers in healthcare, wages are supplemented by informal payments as 
well as by a relatively generous system of bonuses. Reports on the practice of informal 
payments in the Romanian healthcare system claim that an average of 41 percent of out-of-
pocket health expenditure exists in the system (Moldovan and Van de Walle 2013). Although 
the persistence of informal payments was used by governments as an argument for promoting 
the privatisation of the healthcare sector (Stan 2012), they continued to be a mechanism for 
socialising wage payments for healthcare workers. Proposals to devise a code of practice for 
informal payments put forward by the government in 2015 were met with resistance from 
both the trade unions and individual workers (Ziare.com 2015). 
The above factors contributed to making Romania one of the most important exporting 
country of healthcare professionals. Although there are insufficient data on the actual number 
of doctors that left the country since 2007, rough estimates describe a higher than the EE 
average number of Romanian doctors intending to leave or who left the country 
(Dragomiristeanu, Farcasanu, and Galan 2013). For example, Galan et al. (2011) report that 
around 3 percent of the medical doctors left the country in 2007 and around 9 percent applied 
for a diploma verification, which would allow them to practice medicine in other EU member 
states. Media reports also point towards a massive emigration of doctors with around 5000 
(over 10 percent of the total labour force) leaving the country between 2005 and 2010 
Realitatea.net 2010), and around 17.000 doctors (48 percent of the total number of doctors) 
applying for the recognition of their certificates of practice abroad between 2010 and 2017. 
These numbers are corroborated by the official statistics on the evolution of the total number 
of doctors and healthcare professionals in the country. Even after accounting for the new 
entrants in the system, between 2007 and 2016 the country lost around 14.5 percent of its 
doctors and around 23.5 percent of its medical assistants (see Figure 3). By comparison, 
between 2008 and 2016, the education sector lost 10.5 percent of its employees, although this 
did not impact the job vacancy rate in the sector (see Figure 7 in the Appendix). 
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Figure 3. Number of Doctors (left axis) and Medical Assistants (right axis) in 
5RPDQLDµV± 2016.  
Source: Romanian National Statistical Institute. 
 
Austerity measures have further contributed to emigration and to the worsening of pay and 
working conditions for those who remained in the public system. The crisis response package 
passed by the Boc government in 2010 was amongst the harshest in Europe, having as a main 
target the public sector. Amidst protests from the trade unions both in education and 
healthcare, the government introduced a 25 percent wage cut that slashed the already low 
wages (see Figure 2). At the same time, a hiring freeze that affected all public sector 
institutions was implemented in order to further curtail public expenditures and keep the wage 
bill under control. Promoted as a temporary measure (for up to one year), it took more than 
two years and three governments to pass policies that would gradually unfreeze the public 
sector jobs market. Besides, the government planned to introduce numerous public sector 
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
30
32
34
36
38
40
42
44
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
2
0
1
6
Doctors Medical Assistants
E
U
 A
cc
se
si
o
n
  14 
retrenchment reforms through privatisation and the decentralisation of services. Proposed 
reforms in the healthcare system envisioned the closing of many hospital units as well as the 
privatization of services, including the emergency ones. In 2011, 67 hospitals were shut down 
and a draft bill that proposed the full privatisation of healthcare was put up for public debate 
(Stoiciu 2012). However, the government backed down on the privatisation plans as both 
trade unions and the civil society actors protested the reform. 
These changes took place against the backdrop of a radical labour market reform that 
cancelled the institutional power of trade union confederations by eliminating national level 
collective bargaining agreements while raising the threshold of representativeness, making 
striking more difficult, and asking trade unions to re-register in order to be recognised as 
social partners (Guga 2015). Union attempts to fight the overhaul of collective bargaining did 
little to prevent the reform from being adopted. The reform received praise from international 
institutions which applauded it as a necessary step for eliminating ODERXUPDUNHWµULJLGLWLHV¶
and bringing the public sector expenditures under control by removing inflationary pressures 
JHQHUDWHGWKURXJKFHQWUDOLVHGFROOHFWLYHEDUJDLQLQJ$GăVFăOL܊HLDQG*XJD$VFigure 
4 shows, in the aftermath of the reform, labour conflicts in both sectors have almost 
disappeared. 
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Figure 4. Labour conflicts in the healthcare and education 
sectors: 1993 ± 2016. 
Source: Romanian National Statistical Institute. 
 
However, as we will discuss in the following sections, this does not mean that industrial 
conflict has completely disappeared. On the contrary, austerity measures and the changing 
labour market conditions in the public sector have forced trade unions to rethink their 
strategies and devise alternative means to exert pressure on governments.  
 
Trade union strategies in the healthcare sector 
 
There are three representative union federations in the Romanian healthcare sector, with 
Sanitas being by far the largest one with 92 thousand members (see Table 2)3. Besides 
                                                          
3
 It is worth noting that Sanitas uses elements from the servicing model of trade unionism with an organising approach. For 
example, the union provides a range of services to its members including training, holiday tickets at preferential prices, and 
financial help in case of unexpected life events.  
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differences in association power resources, healthcare unions have also followed different 
discursive strategies towards austerity and healthcare reforms. Importantly, whereas in the 
aftermath of the economic crisis Sanitas has consistently argued for a fairer distribution of 
wages across the healthcare sector and advocated for wage increases for low-paid workers, 
Solidaritatea Sanitara has followed a more individualistic agenda, which emphasised 
performance-based-pay and reflected the narrow interests of its constituency which was 
primarily made of doctors (Stan and Erne 2016). Still, by 2018, this cleavage in the sector 
seems to be less evident as Solidaritatea Sanitara has gradually shifted its position closer to 
that of Sanitas especially on the contentious issue of capping bonus levels. 
In the context of a radical alteration in collective bargaining legislation that slashed collective 
rights, trade unions had to re-establish themselves as legitimate actors and rebuild their 
institutional resources by rekindling social dialogue in the sector and signing collective 
bargaining agreements. The task proved to be a daunting one since both the new institutional 
arrangements as well as the austerity measures implemented in response to the crisis made 
sectoral and national collective bargaining almost impossible to sustain. As a result, in 2011 
and 2012 Sanitas signed two collective bargaining agreements, covering only the group of 
units under the administration of the Ministry of Health, thus leaving the private sector outside 
the scope of the agreements. Both documents reflected the narrow scope of the new collective 
bargaining rules and did not include provisions on pay, overtime, or annual leave (Ciutacu 
2012; Stan and Erne 2016). 
A year later, in 2013, Sanitas joined other actors in the healthcare sector including the College 
of Physicians4 and the newly established Trade Union of Physicians in the Coalition of 
Healthcare Professionals (CHP) in a bid to frame the existing problems in the sector in terms 
RIDV\VWHPLFFULVLV7KH&+3¶VDJHQGDUHIOHFWHGWKHYDULRXVLQWHUHVWVRILWVFRQVWLWXHQWs and 
included both very broad and very specific demands including the allocation of 6 percent of 
GDP to healthcare, a wage law unique to the healthcare sector, the defence of the dignity of 
healthcare professionals and better conditions for patients in public hospitals. This broad 
agenda was accompanied by specific demands of its members, amongst which Sanitas 
required higher wages for all personnel in the healthcare sector as well as the signing of a 
sectoral collective bargaining agreement for the sector. 
                                                          
4
 The college is the state accredited non-governmental institution with decision-making power on issues such as 
contUROOLQJDQGVXUYHLOODQFHRISK\VLFLDQV¶SUDFWLFHDQGPDOSUDFWLFHOLWLJDWLRQ7KH&ROOHJHLVWKHXQLTXHUHJLVWUDU
of the physicians and the only agency granting the right to practice medicine in Romania. 
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To push for the signing of a sectoral collective bargaining agreement Sanitas used its 
associational and organisational resources to threat with organising a national level strike that 
could contribute to the blocking of the entire healthcare system while also inflicting 
substantial political damage to the government. In preparation for the strike, the CHP and 
especially Sanitas engaged in gathering signatures in support of industrial action while also 
mobilising members for a warning strike that took place in November 2013 and mobilised 
100.000 employees (Mediafax.ro 2013). While the warning strike served as a credible threat 
for further industrial action and sought to force the government to enter negotiations, it also 
brought into the public agenda the impact of austerity on the healthcare sector, giving it a 
political dimension ahead of upcoming elections in 2014. Furthermore, government threats 
with suing the union were also diffused by calling members to take holidays en masse in case 
hospitals applied wage penalties for the strike days (Gandul 2013). 
While the general strike was cancelled because the government accepted to negotiate with the 
CHP, the industrial action had several outcomes. First, it succeeded in pushing for the signing 
of the first sectoral level collective bargaining agreement after the crisis, which restored some 
of the rights lost by workers as a result of austerity policies. Unlike the agreements signed for 
the groups of hospitals, the sectoral agreement included provisions on pay, bonuses, shift 
work, holidays, and working conditions. It also secured a series of short-term concessions, 
including the reopening of 1000 jobs in public hospitals, an agreement to increase the budget 
allocated for healthcare in 2014 and the doubling of pay for doctors during official holidays 
(Mediafax.ro 2013). However, it also revealed the weakness of maintaining coalitions 
between trade unions and non-union actors even in the context of a common interest. The 
coalition collapsed immediately in the aftermath of signing the sectoral collective bargaining 
agreement, although many of its demands were not met. 
Yet, for Sanitas, the 2013 victory allowed it to re-establish itself as the most important 
confederation in the healthcare sector and regain the legitimacy it lost in the aftermath of the 
crisis.5 In consequence, Sanitas gradually became the most vocal opponent of the privatisation 
of healthcare and an advocate of better wages and working conditions. Using a combination 
of strikes and strike threats targeted across key hospitals around the country as well as pickets 
of public institutions, the union succeeded in fighting plans for further privatisation of 
                                                          
5
 One reason for which Sanitas lost legitimacy was the arrest of its leader, Marius Petcu, on anti-corruption 
charges. For a broader discussion on attempts to discredit and weaken trade unions in Romania see Varga and 
Freyberg-Inan (2015).   
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hospitals in 2013 and 2014, while also negotiating substantial wage increases in 2014 ± 2016 
(see Figure 1). 
The issue of pay levels in the healthcare sector re-emerged in 2016, when, against the 
background of negotiations for a new law on unitary payment, the union organised a general 
strike to push for higher wages but also for the reduction of wage inequalities in the sector. 
The use of wage inequality and fair pay as a central framing mechanism for demanding better 
wages allowed Sanitas to gather support for industrial action both amongst skilled and 
unskilled workers. Preceded by a warning-strike and a series of pickets and work-to-rule 
actions organised between September and November 2016, the strike succeeded in pushing 
for another round of wage increases even though the government was strongly opposed to the 
measure.  
The strike mobilised 80 thousand healthcare workers across the country with Sanitas 
emphasising the need to increase wages especially for the low paid workers, who were still 
amongst the lowest paid category workers in the public sector (Mediafax.ro 2016b). The 
migration argument, which in the aftermath of the crisis has gradually gained public and 
political attention (Stan and Erne 2016) was used intensively in framing the need for better 
wages. This came at a time when the public discussion over the impact of migration figured 
prominently on the public agenda, with the Ministry of Labour emphasising the need to 
address the labour deficit across a variety of economic sectors (Gândul.info 2016). 
Amidst opposition from a technocratic government, the Parliament caved in to the demands 
put forward by Sanitas and approved increases in both the level of base pay and bonuses 
(Mediafax.ro 2016a). The strike also paved the way for further negotiations between the 
Sanitas leadership and the newly minted government led by the social democrats in 2017 and 
2018. This embrace of direct negotiations with the government was possible because of the 
existing linkages between the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the Sanitas leadership.6 The 
negotiations continued to target the issue of wages in the sector ± with the new government 
committing to double the level of wages in 2018 in order to address the issue of migration. 
The unprecedented hikes in the wage levels seemed to confirm that the strategy adopted by 
Sanitas which relied on high levels of mobilisation combined with high-level negotiations in 
a context of a tight labour market was successful. 
                                                          
6
 For example, Marius Sepi, the vice-president of Sanitas, is a former member of PSD and was offered a state secretary position in one of 
the PSD governments.  
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However, as of March 2018, the impact of the wage hikes adopted in the sector is mixed. On 
the one hand, the shift of all the social security contributions from employers to employees 
has inflated gross wages in Romania while having no impact on net incomes. On the other 
hand, the significant increases in the level of wages have been accompanied by a capping of 
the bonuses in the sector to 30 percent of wage levels. The measure led to the decrease in the 
net incomes especially for low paid workers and has triggered yet another wave of protests 
around the issues of fairness and wage inequalities. It remains to be seen to what extent this 
latter wave of protests will be successful in altering the effects of the recently adopted changes 
in pay legislation. As the government does not have the fiscal space to accommodate further 
hikes in expenditures, it is likely that conflicts Sanitas will continue to use its associational 
resources to mobilise its members. 
 
Trade union strategies in the education sector 
 
Attempts to introduce market mechanisms and managerialise administration have also 
impacted the education sector. However, unlike unions in healthcare, education unions have 
unequivocally backed these attempts. In October 2008, only months before the onset of the 
economic crisis in Romania, the unions supported a set of reforms that sought to decentralise 
decision making regarding curricula and school management, introduce performance criteria 
WRGLIIHUHQWLDWH VFKRROV DVZHOO DV D V\VWHPRISHUIRUPDQFHSD\ WKDWZRXOG OLQN WHDFKHUV¶
ZDJHV WR WKHLU ³SHUIRUPDQFH LQ FODVV UDWKHU WKDQ WR WKHLU VHQLRULW\ RU FHUWLILFDWLRQ OHYHO´
(Presidential Committee 2008, 74). Sold as a reform that would legitimise a 50 percent wage 
increase promised ahead of elections by the PSD and which received broad Parliamentary 
support, it ultimately served as a mechanism to pacify trade unions while allowing political 
actors to capture the public discourse around the need for a better education system. 
The feebleness of alliances with political actors became evident only a year later, when the 
optimism generated by planned wage increases was suddenly cut back by one of the harshest 
austerity packages in Europe (Ban 2016). In January 2010 the unions reacted with a threat 
with strikes although months earlier they expressed their resolve around the ineffectiveness 
of strikes as a mechanism for demanding wage increases in a context of austerity (HotNews.ro 
2009). Joined by other public sector unions, they formed the Alliance of Public Sector 
Employees to coordinate their actions against the austerity reforms targeting the public sector. 
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In addition, the leaders of FSLI announced an internal consultation of members in order to 
decide whether to start a general strike in the public schools, while also calling for teachers to 
protest by not grading assignments. Both strategies failed: the general strike did not receive 
the majority support, while the teachers refused to join the protest by not grading assignments. 
Further calls to oppose austerity through a general strike in the public sector also failed, thus 
giving the government a green light to proceed with planned reforms. Less than 20 percent of 
teachers joined a boycott of the end of the year exams, signalling that in spite of substantial 
associational resources, trade unions in the education sector lacked organisational power to 
mobilise the rank and file. 
Besides the 25 percent cut in wages, which affected all public sector workers (see Section 2), 
the education sector was further impacted by additional cuts including a hiring freeze, as well 
as the removal of 10.000 workers the majority of which worked on atypical contracts 
including untenured and substitute teaching positions, and support staff (Ziare.com 2010). 
The position of the trade unions regarding the cuts was ambivalent. On the one hand, they 
entered in negotiations with the Ministry of Education, opposing them but ultimately seeking 
to ensure that the impact on tenured jobs and wage levels will be minimal. On the other hand, 
WKH\DFFHSWHGWKHORJLFRI³RSWLPLVDWLRQDQGHIILFLHQF\LQVSHQGLQJWKHSXEOLFPRQH\´SXW
forward by the Ministry (HotNews.ro 2010). 
Several strikes and protests ensued in 2010 but these could not prevent the government to 
implement its programme. In October 2010 FSLI organised a protest in Bucharest which 
gathered only 5000 teachers, calling for a better budget for the sector. The message of the 
protest was a general one against austerity and underfinancing of the sector with trade unions 
failing to present a clear alternative to the position of the government.  
Following the change in the labour regulation in 2011, the trade unions had to resubmit 
requests in courts to certify their representativeness. The new regulations stalled bipartite 
negotiations over the singing of a new sectoral bargaining agreement while also cancelling 
the national collective bargaining agreement. Still, in November 2012 the unions signed two 
new sectoral collective bargaining agreements covering workers in primary and higher 
education. Signed by all three representative federations in the sector, the agreement was 
presented as a major success for the unions. It set rules on pay and working conditions, added 
several days of annual holidays for workers while also introducing rules on solving labour 
conflicts (Apostolul 2012). 
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Yet the two sectoral collective bargaining agreements did not appease the conflict between 
the Ministry and the trade unions. In a direct attempt to reduce the resources mobilised the 
trade unions, the Ministry eliminated the possibility to automatically deduct union 
contributions from wages (Iamandei 2012). It would take a change in government and the 
coming to power of a Minister from the trade union ranks to restore the automatic deductions 
of contributions in June 2012 (DCNews.ro 2012). 
The coming to power of the PSD was also reflected in the strategies adopted by trade unions, 
which began to rely even more on direct negotiations in order to push issues on the policy 
agenda. Beginning with 2012, trade union strategies used almost exclusively cooperation 
mechanisms which favoured negotiations, consultations and lobby for legislative change 
rather than adversarial stances based on seeking to mobilise the rank and file. As one of the 
interviewees noted: 
Interviewee 4: Dialogue and negotiations are the tools of trade 
unions. The protests are only for show-RII >«@ :H KDYH JRRG
UHODWLRQV ZLWK WKH FXUUHQW JRYHUQPHQW >«@ +H >WKH FXUUHQW
education minister]  is really interested in having a social dialogue 
with us, unlike the previous education minister, Daniel Funeriu. 
 
The cooperative stance adopted by the unions was also institutionalised through an agreement 
signed between the Ministry of Education and all the representative union confederations in 
January 2013 (HotNews.ro 2013). The agreement secured the cooperation of trade unions in 
future changes of the education law. Cooperation was also the preferred strategy when dealing 
with the 2013 and 2014 budget negotiations. Even though negotiations depended on the 
SROLWLFDOGHFLVLRQVDQG WKH³SHUVRQDODYDLODELOLW\DQGRSWLRQVRIPLQLVWHUV´ Interviewee 8) 
which made outcomes unpredictable, union leadership preferred to adopt adversarial 
strategies and mobilise the rank and file only as a measure of last resort. 
Mobilisation was also hampered by the pork-barrel political pacts supported by all union 
federations in the sector. Ahead of the 2014 presidential elections, union federations signed 
an agreement with the PSD candidate which established a calendar of wage increases between 
2015 and 2017 in the event that PSD would have gained the presidency (HotNews.ro 2014). 
Furthermore, the outcomes of adopting a cooperative stance have been disastrous for the 
sector. Whereas before the crisis, expenditures allocated to education reached 4.4 percent of 
GDP, in 2013, they were merely 2.8 percent of GDP, the lowest level since 2000 (see Figure 
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1) and one of the lowest expenditure levels in the EU. At the same time, real wages in the 
sector dropped, even though the real national minimum wage increased in 2014 (see Figure 
2). 
Negotiations over wage increases ensued in 2015 and 2016, with trade unions relying almost 
exclusively on negotiations with the government. Arguing that wage levels fell too much 
EHKLQGGRFWRUV¶ZDJHVWKHXQLRQVVRXJKWWRSUHVVXUHWKHJRYHUQPHQWWRIROORZXSZLWKVLPLODU
increases in the education sector. As Figure 2 shows, although the negotiations were relatively 
successful in bringing wage increases in the sector, these did not match the pace of increases 
in healthcare. For example, whereas healthcare workers obtained a 25 percent wage increase 
at the end of 2015, in education the increase was 10 percent lower. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has argued that in the aftermath of the crisis, Romanian trade unions in the 
education and healthcare sectors have used different strategies to defend their interests, which 
has ultimately led to different outcomes for workers in the two sectors. It found that 
PRELOLVDWLRQDQGDGYHUVDULDOVWUDWHJLHVUHPDLQWKHPRVWHIIHFWLYHPHDQVWRGHIHQGZRUNHUV¶
interests, especially in a context of a tight labour market. In contrast, cooperative strategies 
proved to be less effective and ultimately resulted in welfare losses for workers in the 
education sector. 
Building on a power resource approach, the paper has also showed that unions have been 
successful only when they combined different types of resources to push for their agenda. In 
this sense, the paper showed that associational power is relevant only in as much as trade 
unions manage to mobilise it together with organisational and discursive resources. It also 
showed that austerity policies have generated the space to enhance the coalitional power of 
trade unions but that coalitions have ultimately proved to be either difficult to sustain in the 
long term or had a de-mobilising effect on trade unions. Indeed, we show that whereas in the 
KHDOWKFDUHVHFWRUWKHFRDOLWLRQEHWZHHQWUDGHXQLRQVDQGGRFWRUV¶DVVRFLDWLRQVKDVXOWLPDWHO\
failed to sustain the test of time, in the education sector political pacts have de-mobilised trade 
unions and ultimately de-legitimised the union leadership. Political pacts have also proven to 
be unpredictable even in the short term and limited the options that trade unions had to push 
for their agenda. 
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These findings are relevant for the wider debate about public sector reforms in the aftermath 
of the crisis in EE. Romania provides a critical case in which the de-institutionalisation of 
industrial relations has forced trade unions to re-build their power resources. Ultimately, the 
paper shows that trade unions in the public sector have approached the task of rebuilding their 
resources in different ways by either opposing or accepting the dominant discourses about 
austerity and public sector reform and that the uncritical embrace of marketisation and 
individualisation has decreased their power resources.  
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Appendix 
 
List of in-depth interviews with trade unions leaders. 
 
We carried out ten interviews with former officials and top-level union leaders from the 
healthcare sector, and four interviews with national-level union leaders from the education 
sector. The interviews I1 to I4 took place in June-July 2014 in Bucharest, while interviews I5 
to I10 were taken in July-August 2016, in Bucharest. 
 
I1 = interviewee no. 1 ± Top-level union leader in the main healthcare trade union (national 
level federation) in Romania. 
I2 = interviewee no. 2 ± Former counsellor of the healthcare minister. 
I3 = interviewee no. 3 ± Top-level union leader in one of the education trade union (national 
level federation) in Romania. 
I4 = interviewee no. 4 ± Top-level union leader in one of the education trade union (national 
level federation) in Romania. 
I5 = interviewee no. 5 ± Top-level union leader in the main healthcare trade union (national 
level federation) in Romania. 
I6 = interviewee no. 6 ± Top-level union leader in one of the education trade union (national 
level federation) in Romania. 
I7 = interviewee no. 7 ± Top-level union leader in one of the healthcare trade union (national 
level federation) in Romania. 
I8 = interviewee no. 8 ± Top-level union leader in one of the education trade union (national 
level federation) in Romania 
I9 = interviewee no. 9 ± Top-level union leader in one of the healthcare trade union (national 
level federation) in Romania. 
I10 = interviewee no. 10 ± Top-level union leader in one of the healthcare trade union 
(national level federation) in Romania. 
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Figure 5. Wage distribution in the healthcare sector in Romania in October 2015.  
Source: Romanian National Statistical Institute. 
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Figure 6. Wage distribution in the education sector in Romania in October 2015.  
Source: Romanian National Statistical Institute. 
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Figure 7. Job vacancy rate (%) in education and healthcare sectors: 2005 ± 2016. 
Source: Romanian National Statistical Institute. 
Note: The large drop in the job vacancy rate in the healthcare sector between 2008 and 2010 
is explained by the closure of hospitals and the freezing of hiring in response to the crisis. 
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